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Today at a meeting of the Board of Elections, County staffers announced that they had completed a pilot-study of software verification. The County contracted with SysTest Labs to produce a software audit protocol and to privately test that protocol on a sample of iVotronic systems. Based upon that pilot study the County has asserted that the eighteen systems tested are clean, and they have announced their intention to release a full report detailing the protocol undertaken in no less than two weeks, likely well after the election is completed. We note that we still await a comprehensive report on the prior primary election that was promised to the BOE and the general public last January. We have hopes that this will be released as well.

Until this public report is available, VoteAllegheny cannot endorse the test. However, we note that eighteen systems are *far too few* to constitute a representative sample of the county. The details of the testing and chains of custody are crucial and without that information we cannot place full faith in the process.

We agree vehemently with Suzanne Broughton, President of the League of Women Voters of Greater Pittsburgh, that public oversight is essential and that the county is well equipped to include the public in this process. Indeed, as others at the meeting noted, the state elections code includes specific provisions for the inclusion of citizen oversight as a necessary part of public elections.

During the meeting this process was characterized as a first step or *pilot-project* for later, statistically significant testing. We view it in the same way. The study will *no*t be a complete or comprehensive software verification until it is performed publicly, covers a statistically significant number of systems, includes PEBs and occurs both before and after the election. It is good to note that county staffers expressed support for all these points.

For future studies we urge the county to hire local Allegheny County employees and to turn to the local population rather than subcontracting to national companies. The responsibility for public elections is the public's alone. For that reason the citizens and employees of Allegheny County should take primary responsibility. This move will enhance both public oversight and election security.

Security is a process not a product, and it must be carried out and refined in public view. This first step shows the success of public pressure in motivating County officials to improve our election security above what has gone before. Every jurisdiction across the country in which voters must rely on software-dependent voting machines should add a public software verification process to their election integrity efforts. This work will continue after election day when the report on this pilot project will be released and the real analysis may be made.

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